Release Checklist¶
Use this checklist before and after cutting a release from main.
Known recurring papercut: release-please’s PR needs a manual Cargo.lock sync¶
release-please’s Rust workspace plugin bumps Cargo.toml’s
workspace.package.version and version.txt, but it does not run
cargo update — every workspace member’s version entry in Cargo.lock
still shows the old version, and CI’s --locked --frozen --offline gates
(Rust Build + Tests, Dependency Scan) correctly refuse to drift the
lockfile silently and fail closed with cannot update the lock file ... because --frozen was passed.
Before merging a release-please PR, always run on that branch:
cargo update --workspace
Confirm the diff touches only the in-workspace package version entries
(no external dependency version changes) before committing — a plain
cargo update without --workspace scoping could otherwise pull in
unrelated upstream bumps that don’t belong in a version-bump-only PR.
Push the fix directly onto the release-please branch (it exists to be
amended pre-merge); do not open a competing PR against it.
Note: release-please can force-push/regenerate this branch from
scratch at any point while the PR stays open (observed: it did so once
after another PR merged into main, then did not on a later main
merge — the exact trigger isn’t “every push,” just “whenever it decides
its release PR is out of date”), which drops any manually-pushed fixup
commits (including this exact fix and this exact note). Re-verify both
are still present immediately before merging — don’t assume a fix
applied earlier in the PR’s life is still there just because it
survived one prior push to main.
Before Tagging¶
Confirm
mainbranch protection matches the Rust-native required checks.make verify-branch-protectionRun the local merge-equivalent gates.
make verify-assurance make ci
Exercise the checked-in release packaging path.
make smoke-release make release-emulate
Confirm the docs/download surface still builds and link-checks cleanly.
make docs-checkConfirm the security assurance report can be generated for the candidate.
python3 scripts/security_assurance_gate.py \ --json-out dist/security-assurance-report.json \ --markdown-out dist/security-assurance-report.md
If you are validating an already-published tag, verify the public release surface directly.
make verify-published-release TAG=paranoid-passwd-v3.8.0
After Publishing¶
Verify that the release workflow produced every expected CLI and GUI artifact plus
checksums.txt, including Linux.debpackages, macOS GUI.dmgimages, and the Windows GUI.msi.Verify that payload-layout validation passed for every archive,
.dmg, Debian package, and MSI package, not just the host-runnable smoke artifacts.Verify there are no stale browser-era or otherwise unexpected assets attached to the release.
Verify GitHub attestation for at least one downloaded artifact from each packaging family you ship.
Confirm the release download verification matrix ran the Windows GUI MSI row on a Windows runner.
Re-run installer validation against the published release surface if needed.
Confirm Homebrew, Scoop, and Chocolatey manifests were generated and published through their PR flow.
Do not describe artifacts as platform-signed unless the matching platform checks in Platform Installers and Signing passed for the published release.
When validating a platform-signed release candidate, run the release validation path with
PARANOID_RELEASE_SIGNING_MODE=signedon hosts that can verify the relevant platform signature.For macOS signed candidates, confirm the release workflow imported the Developer ID certificate and that
scripts/macos_sign_notarize.shsigned/notarized bothParanoid Passwd.appand the GUI.dmgbefore publication.For Windows signed candidates, confirm the release workflow imported the signing certificate into the current-user certificate store, that
scripts/windows_sign_artifact.shsigned the staged GUI executable before WiX packaging, and that it signed and verified the GUI.msibefore publication.
Canary Expectations¶
The first release after a pipeline change should be treated as a canary:
inspect the archive matrix
inspect the Debian package set
inspect the macOS GUI
.dmgsetinspect the Windows GUI
.msiverify the checksums
verify provenance
verify
install.shconfirm the docs download links resolve
confirm the public docs still describe unsigned artifacts as checksummed and attested, not as platform-signed
If any of those fail, treat the release pipeline as untrusted until the failure is fixed and the validation path passes again.